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Abstract 
Business angels (BAs) - high net worth individuals who provide informal risk capital to firms 
- are seen as important providers of entrepreneurial finance. Theory and conventional wisdom 
suggest that the need for face-to-face interaction will ensure angels will have a strong 
predilection for local investments. We empirically test this assumption using a large 
representative survey of UK BAs. Our results show local bias is less common than previously 
thought with only one quarter of total investments made locally. However, we also show 
pronounced regional disparities, with investment activity dominated by BAs in London and 
Southern England. In these locations there is a stronger propensity for localised investment 
patterns mediated by the “thick” nature of the informal risk capital market. Together these 
trends further reinforce and exacerbate the disparities evident in the UK’s financial system. 
The findings make an important contribution to the literature and public policy debates on the 
uneven nature of financial markets for sources of entrepreneurial finance.  
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1. Introduction 
Business Angels (BAs) play an increasingly important role financing start-ups across 
many advanced countries (Cumming and Zhang, 2019). A typical BA takes wealth accrued 
from their own entrepreneurial endeavours and uses it to provide risk capital, along with 
advice and support to new firms (Shane, 2009; Wiltbank et al, 2009). There is growing 
interest in angel investors, not least in the UK where they are regarded as a crucial 
component of the country’s financial system for small firms (Wright et al, 2015; British 
Business Bank, 2018), helping establish household names such as Innocent Smoothies (Grilli, 
2019). Angels can have positive impacts on venture growth, survival, and employment (Kerr 
et al., 2011) and can help recycle entrepreneurial wealth within local economies (Clarysse et 
al, 2014). They play a particularly important role in poorer regions where formal venture 
capital (VC) is less abundant (Jones-Evans and Thompson, 2009) and can be “major 
catalysts” of new venture creation allowing localities to follow new development paths 
(Martin, 2010, p. 19).  Because of this, ensuring firms in lagging regions can access BA 
funding is an important goal of public policy (Nightingale et al, 2009). 
The dominant view in the literature is that BAs predominantly have local search horizons. 
Indeed, one of the pioneers of angel research claimed the likelihood angels investing in firms 
increases exponentially “the shorter the distance between the two parties” (Wetzel, 1983, p. 
27). Owing to this, angels and other equity investors are often “dominated by parochialism” 
and “local bias” (Shane and Cable, 2002; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Harrison et al, 2010) with 
a strong preference for investing “in local firms” (Cumming and Zhang, 2019, p. 693). Close 
proximity facilitates the transfer of “soft information” which encompasses assessments of the 
entrepreneur, the firm and the competitiveness of its products and managerial capabilities 
(Hall and Lerner, 2010; Kerr et al, 2011). Consequently, there is a widely-held perception 
that equity investors utilise decision-rules such as the ‘20 minute rule’ (where VCs only 
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invest in companies located within a 20 minute drive from their office) to inform decision-
making (Cumming and Dai, 2010). Whereas the veracity of such heuristics is questionable, a 
substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that the “information intensive” nature of the 
investment process means that equity investors have an overwhelming local bias (Martin et 
al, 2002; Mason and Harrison, 2002; Martin et al, 2005; Cumming and Dai, 2010). 
BAs remain a relatively under-researched topic partially due to their somewhat “hidden” 
nature (Mason and Harrison, 2008). Reviews of the literature have noted a relative dearth of 
research on spatial factors associated with BA investments (Harrison et al, 2010; Tenca et al, 
2018). Consequently, little is known about “the impact of distance” on different types of 
angels (White and Dumay, 2017, p. 206). In other words, what types of angels have the 
strongest preferences for localised investment patterns, the people element, what types of 
companies they invest in, and the precise nature of their investments are all poorly 
understood. These were the questions posed by Cumming and Dai (2010) in their work on 
local bias and VC investments in the US, but to date these questions have not been addressed 
in the specific context of BAs. Furthermore, with some notable exceptions (Harrison et al, 
2010; Herrmann et al 2016; Bertoni et al 2015), the overwhelming body of work on local bias 
focuses on the US (Harrison and Mason, 2019). This means that the UK – a country where 
BAs make around 2,500 investments annually, amounting to around $1.5bn (British Business 
Bank, 2018) – has been relatively neglected. 
This paper addresses these gaps in the evidence using a unique survey of 546 UK BAs. 
The data constitutes a significant proportion of the overall population of the UK BA market 
and should be broadly representative of the overall cohort of UK BAs, echoing calls for 
greater use of registry-based data sources to ensure a fuller coverage of the entire population 
of BAs (Avdeitchikova and Landström, 2016). We use this data and a series of probit 
regression models to answer two overarching research questions: 
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i) Is there a local bias in the investment patterns of UK BAs? 
ii) If so, what are the personal and behavioural dynamics shaping these spatial 
investment patterns?  
We empirically examine these questions by assessing where BAs invest in the context of 
distance from their home base, and then identifies potential differences between BAs who 
have a preference for local investment and their more geographically adventurous peers in the 
contexts of (a) their human capital and level of investment expertise, (b) the types of 
investments they make, and, (c) the nature of investee companies.  
Our findings make a number of contributions to the literature on the geographies of 
entrepreneurial finance, a topic which is crucial for regional development (Martin et al, 2005; 
Grilli, 2018).   First, we use a large dataset which is checked for consistency and 
representativeness against a major UK survey conducted by the UK British Business Angels 
Association in 2016-17 on key metrics such as scale of total investments, regional location of 
business angels, years holding investment stakes and investment motivations. Most prior 
work on BAs derives from smaller non-representative convenience samples (Mason and 
Harrison, 2008) or smaller samples as reported in a recent meta-analysis by Fili and Grunberg 
(2016). Our data is benchmarked against reports by the UK Business Angels Association, 
86% of whom claim investor tax relief through the SEIS and EIS schemes (British Business 
Bank, 2018). Second, we focus specifically on BAs, a set of investors for whom the evidence 
base on local investment bias is thin and inconclusive1. Finally, given the emergence of new 
investment channels such as equity crowdfunding (Langley and Leyshon, 2017; Wang et al, 
2019), there may be further reasons to revisit the issue of proximity (Herrmann et al, 2016). 
 
1 While early studies found as many as three out of four BA investments occurred locally (Mason and Harrison, 
1994; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008), recent studies report a diminishing propensity to invest locally 
(Avdeitchikova, 2008; Harrison, 2010; Wright et al, 2015).  
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Our work challenges the “local bias thesis” and shows investing at distance is much more 
commonplace than previously thought. The fact more experienced angels prefer to invest on a 
wider geographic scale suggests some angels undergo “experiential learning” which 
temporally and spatially alters their investment behaviour. That said, in regions where the 
population of BAs are most notable (i.e. South-East of England) these investments are less 
spatially diffuse suggesting that the nature of local demand conditions and the nature of local 
context remain crucial for mediating BA investment behaviour. Together these findings 
present stern challenges for policy efforts designed to encourage and foster angel investments 
as a tool for promoting regional economic development, especially in more peripheral UK 
regions.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature relating to 
entrepreneurial finance and distance. Section 3 presents our data and methodology. Section 4 
presents our econometric analysis; section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Geography of Entrepreneurial Finance  
2.1 Informational and Agency Issues  
Small business finance is classically thought to be a close-knit affair dominated by 
“home bias” (De Young et al, 2008). This “home bias” may also exist within countries, and 
studies have shown it exists for a large number of countries (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; 
Lee and Luca, 2018). There are two strong a priori theoretical explanations for this bias: 
informational and agency problems. “Information asymmetries” are important in credit 
markets (Ackerlof, 1970) as informational opacity is a key feature of start-ups and SMEs 
(Cassar, 2004). Young and small firms are less able to convey creditworthiness to potential 
investors (Berger and Udell, 1998). Most SMEs lack sufficient collateral to offset these 
informational asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998). This problem is exacerbated for 
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innovative SMEs due to their informational opacity, intangible assets and untested 
technology (Hall and Lerner, 2010). As a consequence, innovative start-ups are unable to 
access traditional forms of finance and, as suggested by the pecking order of funding 
preferences (Myers, 1984), resort to equity investors such as BAs and VCs (Berger and 
Udell, 1998).  
Equity finance raises important theoretical concerns regarding agency issues. Under 
an agency perspective, entrepreneurs are depicted as agents or “potential thieves” and 
investors are the principals or “police officers” (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). This owes to 
the twin problems of “hidden information” and “hidden action” whereby entrepreneurs either 
conceal information, shirk or invest in ‘pet’ projects unaligned to the objectives of investors 
(Cumming et al, 2019). To mitigate against these moral hazard issues and poor decision 
making by entrepreneurs (i.e. the agent), the principal (i.e. the angel) has to closely monitor 
their investee firms.  
These agency concerns are geographical because BAs invest locally to allow close 
monitoring of their investments (Shane and Cable, 2002). Distance “amplifies information 
asymmetries” and creates uncertainty because of the unfamiliarity of the context within 
which a venture is embedded (Colombo et al, 2019, p. 1152). To cope with these problems 
investors’ often look to their own personal networks. To minimise the uncertainty caused by 
agency risks, BAs invest in companies in close geographical proximity which some label the 
so-called “localized investor hypothesis” (Wong et al, 2009). Shane and Cable (2002, p. 377) 
found that US VCs and BAs overcome the agency problems by exploiting “their social ties to 
gather private information” about their investee firms.  
There are additional reasons why the market for entrepreneurial finance may be 
localised. Entrepreneurial opportunities are increasingly viewed as a “process of social 
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interaction (between a community and entrepreneur) rather than solely an outcome of 
thinking” by entrepreneurs (Shepherd, 2015, p. 491). For angel investors, decision making is 
informed by close interaction and relational engagement with entrepreneurs rather than 
hands-off formal due diligence (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Croce, et al, 2017). The 
importance of the entrepreneur in determining investment decisions is conveyed by the 
metaphor of “backing the jockey not the horse” (Harrison and Mason, 2017) because 
concerns about the entrepreneur are the overwhelming reason why angels reject opportunities 
(Mason et al, 2016). Relationships and social capital are crucial mediating the link between 
entrepreneurs and sources of finance and these are strongly geographically embedded (Uzzi, 
1999; Kemeny et al, 2015; Flögel, 2017). In sum, close functional and relational proximity 
helps offset the risks of taking equity in opaque ventures.  
2.2 Relational Geographies and Entrepreneurial Finance 
There has been an upsurge of interest in relational geographies and how distance, 
relationships, and networks interact and mediate behaviour (Wray, 2012; Kuebart, 2019). The 
relational perspective offers insights into innovation activities (Faulconbridge, 2017) because 
within geographical bounded spaces, relationships, networks, social capital and “buzz” are 
pivotal relational elements (Kemeny et al, 2015). These processes by their nature are 
dynamic, fluid and unstructured. Storper and Venables (2004) claim it is the “unplanned 
contact system” or “buzz” which engenders learning and resource gathering opportunities 
“among actors embedded in a community by just being there” (Bathelt et al, 2004, p. 31). By 
operating in close geographic proximity, entrepreneurs can “meet and mate” with providers 
such as banks, VCs and local BAs (van Rijnsoever, 2020). These relationships are vital for 
equity investors because they “depend crucially on access to personal networks and face-to-
face contacts in finding, evaluating, and monitoring investment opportunities” (Martin et al, 
2005, p. 1213). Not only does this enable entrepreneurs to engage with potential funders, it 
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also facilitates trust which is a crucial ingredient mediating these financial relationships 
(Uzzi, 1999; Huang and Pearce, 2015). Conversely, given the central role played by social 
ties and relational connections, non-local ventures may find it harder to build trust with BA 
investors (Shane and Cable, 2002).  
While distance is most commonly conceived geographically, it is also a proxy for 
cultural and social proximity (Bonini et al, 2018). In addition to functional proximity 
(distance), economic geographers use the concepts of “cognitive” and “relational” proximity, 
non-tangible proximities such as behavioural mind-set and trust with social and 
organisational dimensions (Herrmann et al, 2016; Wray, 2012; Kuebart, 2019). These factors 
also encompass things such as similar educational, social or professional backgrounds, 
mutual acquaintances, affinities through clubs/associations which give entrepreneurial actors 
common frames of reference (Herrmann et al, 2016).  
A number of studies have analysed the geographies of equity investments 
(predominantly VC) from a relational perspective. The term ‘relational coordination’ is used 
by scholars to summarize the governance of relational distance between VC firms’ and their 
investee firms (Kuebart, 2019). Wray et al (2011) constructed relational geometries and 
found significant heterogeneity between different spatial finance communities in terms of 
their networks of connections, highlighting how VCs have numerous connections 
transcending regional boundaries. Whereas VCs in North East of England operated in 
isolation both from each other and extra-local investor networks, by contrast, East Midland 
finance agents operated in far less territorially bounded ways (Wray et al, 2011). Another 
German study found that VCs offset the negative effects associated with long physical 
distances by investing via syndicates (Fritsch and Schilder, 2012). A recent Swedish study of 
the geography of BAs investments found that geographic proximity was only important 
insofar as it facilitates close relational proximity (Herrmann et al, 2016).  
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Technological change is also altering relational geographies. A good example of this 
is the rapid onset of equity crowdfunding (Langley and Leyshon, 2017). Arguably, the 
digitalization of early-stage finance is reducing the need for proximity between a firm and the 
investor (Wang et al, 2019). Risk averse angels can piggyback on the due diligence 
undertaken by platforms and have their investments de-risked by small investors – the so-
called “crowd” (Langley and Leyshon, 2017) – obviating the need for physical closeness. So 
while the debate spatial proximity between investor and investee firms remains inconclusive, 
recent work suggests that some investors may be able to overcome negative distance effects 
by relational means (Wray, 2011; Kuebart, 2019).  
   
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Risk and Investor Experience 
In the context of distance and local bias in BA investing, we discuss two key issues 
that may help determine preferences for investing locally: risk and investor experience. Both 
matter given the information asymmetries that characterise the market for capital for younger, 
smaller private companies (Berger and Udell, 1998). Informal equity investment markets are 
characterised by significant risk and investment uncertainty (Wiltbank et al, 2009). Given a 
significant majority of angels, have accrued entrepreneurial and business ownership 
experience, a form of accumulated and relevant human capital, we might expect a positive 
association between accumulated experience and confidently investing at distance, an 
empirical feature identified in prior VC studies.  
As investors become more experienced they may get better at due diligence and 
organising their deal flow (Wiltbank, 2009). For example, Cumming and Dai (2010) found 
that more experience US VCs had less local bias, although specific technological knowledge 
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could increased local bias. VCs in Canada demand a “lemons” premium to offset the 
uncertainty of long-distance investments (Carpentier and Suret, 2006). These positive 
reputational effects on distance are attributed to the demand-side of the market as companies 
conducted active searches for VCs with a good reputation (i.e, bigger, older, more 
experienced etc.), and to an asymmetric information reducing effect as ‘good’ companies 
seek out better quality VCs. Consistent with the sorting and matching process outlined in 
Cipollone and Giordani (2018), as better projects from better companies present themselves 
to VCs with a good reputation, this reduces the need for VCs to have representation on the 
boards of distant companies. 
All these general inferences apply to the BA equity investment market. We have 
several measures of experience including: (a) having a financial qualification, (b) number of 
companies previously run, (c) years of investment experience, and, (d) current business 
ownership. Linking back to the theoretical agency concerns identified earlier, we would 
envisage that greater experience offsets the need for close proximity. We propose two broad 
hypotheses: 
H1: Relevant business-related human capital will be positively associated with investing at 
distance 
H2: Relevant investment related experience will be positively associated with investing at 
distance 
Soft information flows, screening, and monitoring 
Physical proximity has long been recognised as reducing the informational opacity of 
small firms (Flögel, 2017). Closer physical proximity facilitates the capture of soft 
information that more distant transactional arms-length relationships cannot replicate (Uzzi, 
1999). This increases the quality of information available when making lending decisions. 
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Intuitively, much of this would seem applicable for BA equity investments. In the angel 
investment setting, knowledge shared through frequent interaction is seen as a way of 
fostering mutual understanding and informational exchange (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2001). 
Plus, the transfer of tacit knowledge in both directions decreases the “relational risk” by 
reducing misunderstandings between investors and entrepreneurs (Fili and Grünberg, 2016). 
Harrison et al (2010) identify three main informational drivers of local bias. First, the 
set of potential investments is geographically restricted due to ‘distance decay’ in the 
availability of information. Given sunk costs in gathering information, which rise with 
distance, it is cheaper and more efficient to use established local networks to identify new 
investment opportunities. Secondly, they argue that entrepreneur themselves has a higher 
weighting, and a more important role, in the investment decision of angels than by VCs 
(Kelly and Hay, 2003; Mason et al, 2016). Local networks and personal knowledge about 
individual entrepreneurs and investment opportunities reduces information asymmetries when 
investing locally (Wong et al, 2009).  
Thirdly, close geographical proximity also enables effective monitoring through 
regular visits. This need for close monitoring was depicted in an Australian study with one 
angel expressing their desire to stay “close to my money” (White and Dumay, 2018, p. 22). 
Once an investment has been made, monitoring costs increase with distance and monitoring 
of investments can be extended to include a more general desire for BAs to take an active 
role within the investee business (Shane and Cable, 2002). Sorheim and Landström (2001) 
found that local bias was a particular characteristic of active investors. Trust may also be 
geographically mediated – it appears to be an important transactional lubricant for BAs 
(Kelly and Hay, 2003) and has been shown to be pivotal “heuristic” shaping angel 
investments (Huang and Pearce, 2016). Investing locally enables angels to identify 
entrepreneurs that they know and trust.  
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To obviate informational problems, BAs seek recourse to close post-investment 
involvement to remain in close relational proximity to their investee companies. This gives 
rise to our third and fourth hypotheses: 
H3: Business angels who want to take an active operational management role are more likely 
to invest locally 
H4: Business angels who want to take an active strategic management role are more likely to 
invest locally 
3. Data, Methodology and Descriptive Statistics  
 
Our data was collated by Ipsos Mori, a large independent survey house, via a 
Computer Aided Telephone Interview (CATI) survey process in 2014, using a stratified 
sample drawn from a register of UK BAs. In total, our sample includes responses from 546 
active BA investors2. The total number of BAs in the UK is estimated to be between 8,000 
and 15,000 (the total membership of the UK British Business Angels Association), but not all 
angels are actively investing at any time (British Business Bank, 2018). To the best of our 
knowledge this constitutes one of the largest ever samples of BAs to date (see Fili and 
Grünberg, 2016)3, representing between 3.3% and 6.3% of all UK BAs.  
In terms of the sample construction, the starting point was a total of 3,823 individual 
records of individuals who had sought tax relief on their investments since 2011. After a 
series of checks this generated 2,434 usable leads with a further 254 individuals opted out 
after an initial screening letter. The remainder were batched at random into subsamples with 
1,255 investors being uploaded into the CATI system. The questionnaire included screener 
 
2 The largest previous sample of UK angels was 403 (Wright et al, 2015). 
3 A meta-analysis of angel studies found that the average sample size of empirical studies was only around 140 
(Fili and Grünberg, 2016). 
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questions to ensure that respondents were eligible having applied to take advantage of the tax 
relief. This sample was checked for its regional and investment year equivalence against UK 
government annual published records of risk capital investments. Random probability 
telephone surveys were undertaken from 5th August to 5th September 2014 after an initial 
pilot testing of the survey instrument between 30th July and 4th August 2014. Finally, we 
checked the representativeness of our achieved sample against the largest UK survey of 
business angels published by the UKBAA and these comparisons are reported below. 
The survey covers issues relating to; (a) the personal characteristics and experiences 
of BAs, (b) their motivations for investing, and, (c) the nature of the investments. We note 
that this is a survey, rather than official data, and the answers need to be seen in this context. 
However, we have no particular grounds to believe that that results are skewed in any 
particular direction. For consistency we compare our survey data against that reported by a 
large (n=658 business angels) survey in 2016-17 conducted amongst members of the UK 
Business Angels Association (see British Business Bank, 2018). On total value of 
investments, we find a close correspondence with 53% of UKBAA respondents reporting 
investments <=£50,000 (47% in our survey), 20% £50-99,000 (19%), and 28% >£100,000 
(33%). Regarding years business angels hold their investment stakes the UKBAA survey 
reported 3% held their stakes for <=2 years (11% in our survey), 57% for 3-5 years (46%), 
and 40% for more than 5 years (43%). The UKBAA respondents indicated that 76% invested 
for the returns compared to 69% investing for financial reasons in our survey. Overall, we 
find a degree of correspondence in responses across several key metrics which gives us 
confidence in its broader representativeness. 
The key survey question that allows us to distinguish between BAs who have a 
preference for local, regional, or national investments ascertains where angels invest using 
the following spatial demarcations: 
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• Within 20 miles (32 km) of you (‘Local’) 
• Within your region (‘Regional’) 
• Outside of your region but in the UK (‘National’)  
• Outside of the UK (‘International’)  
The survey elicited the following responses: Local, 26.8%; Regional, 18.0%, National, 
53.6%, and International, 1.7%. For the following descriptive statistics and core empirical 
analysis we merge the last two categories due to the small numbers of BAs who invested 
internationally. These findings compare to European VC investment figures reported by 
Bertoni et al (2015) of 48.6% within 31 miles (50km), 22.6% between 31 and 186 miles 
(300km), and 28.8% over 186 miles (300km). 
Figure 1 shows how the angel population is distributed across the UK regions.  There 
are strong regional disparities in the respective population shares. Five regions have a greater 
angel share than their respective population share - London, South East England (SE), South 
West England (SW), West Midlands (WM), and Yorkshire & Humberside (YH). The South 
East has 3.5 times its population share, the South West 2.6 times its population share, and 
London 2.4 times, suggesting the spatial composition of our sample is consistent with the 
London / South Eastern focused overall BA population (British Business Bank, 2018). In 
contrast, the North East of England (NE) has only 1/11th of its population share, Northern 
Ireland (NI) 1/9th, and Wales (W) 1/5th. This highlights the significant regional disparities 
apparent in the UK in terms of the distribution of BAs. If all angels exclusively invested in 
their locality, then this would generate an uneven pattern of angel investment activity. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Table 1 reveals BAs with a preference for local investment are no more likely to have 
a financial qualification.  Number of years of investment experience was clearly associated 
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with longer-distance investments. This suggests that a willingness to invest at greater 
physical distance is associated with direct human capital relevant to investing, a longer track 
record. It also avoids the ‘stepping-on-toes’ effect which was identified by Cipollone and 
Giordani (2018) as a notable feature of localised investing. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 shows that risk tolerance has no effect on the distance at which they are 
willing to invest. Solo or co-investing investing also did not matter. On the involvement of 
the BA in the day-to-day operations, the majority of BAs do not undertake such roles in any 
of their investee companies. Importantly, the probability of being active in day-to-day 
operations diminishes with distance suggesting that there is a time cost which increases with 
distance and this constrains BA involvement. This finding is supported in respect of 
involvement in the strategic management of investee companies. Again, there is a negative 
association with investment distance. Taken together, the two strands of evidence suggest that 
UK BAs are very passive investors, and that this passivity increases with physical distance in 
the investment relationship. 
Table 1 also details our data on investment patterns. There is a positive association 
between the number of companies a BA is currently invested in and distance, with local BAs 
averaging 3.69 investee companies and national BAs averaging 5.32 investee companies. 
This might suggest that distance encourages BAs to adopt a broader portfolio approach to de-
risk their total investment.  
In relation to what stage in a company’s life BAs invest in we find no spatial 
differences. On size of largest investment, we find that the majority of BA investments in 
total are for less than £50,000, supporting the consensus that angels operate at a level far 
below that of VCs. Nationally focused BAs have the highest incidence of the very smallest 
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scale of investments, at 65.8%. However, we also find that the incidence of very substantial 
large-scale investments over £0.5m increases with distance which again chimes with other 
previous studies (Harrison et al, 2010).  
4. Results  
We estimate econometric models to identify key differences between BAs who 
operate at three distinct spatial levels, local, regional, and national. As the classification is 
ordered and categorical (from local, to regional, to national), we choose to estimate a series of 
ordered probit models where an underlying score is estimated as a linear function of the 
independent variables (personal, behavioural, and investment characteristics) and a set of cut-
points. The probability of observing outcome i corresponds to the probability that the 
estimated linear function, plus a random error, is within the range of the cut-points estimated 
for the outcome: Pr(outcomej = i) = Pr(κi−1 < β1x1j + β2x2j + · · · + βkxkj + uj ≤ κi) where uj 
is assumed to be normally distributed. We estimate the coefficients β1, β2, . . , βk together 
with the cut-points κ1, κ2, . . , κI−1, where I is the number of possible outcomes. κ0 is taken as 
−∞, and κI is taken as +∞.  
We include three broad groups of control variables. As with any such survey, there is 
a trade-off between speed of completion and detail in the questions asked. This survey 
provides a relatively large sample of a hard-to-reach group, and to do so the emphasis was on 
clarity and concision. The first set of controls are for personal characteristics. We follow 
Mason and Harrison (2017) in considering financial qualifications of the BA which we feel 
may influence perceptions of risk. We also consider two measures of experience, number of 
previous companies and years of experience, and other activities, whether a business owner, 
employed, unemployed, or retired. Second, we include a set of behavioural or attitudinal 
variables. This includes perception of risk, whether sole investor, degree or day-to-day or 
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strategic management, and whether willing to lose half of their investment. Finally, we 
include a set of variables for investment characteristics. This includes variables for the years 
they tend to hold stakes, number of companies, and whether they invest in high-tech 
companies. Life-stage is likely to be closely related to supervision. We also include both 
largest investment and, to capture a potential non-linearity as very large investments require 
closer and so more local supervision, largest investment squared. There is a trade-off between 
length or the survey and response rates. Some of these variables will, of course, hide 
significant nuance. But their brevity allows a larger sample size.  
The full set of models are contained in Table 2. The first model includes the personal 
characteristics. This model is well specified, but the only variable that is significant is years 
of investment experience, which is positively associated with distance in investment 
behaviour: knowledge and experience gained through prior investments appears to give BAs 
greater confidence to invest at distance. This is in accordance with the VC literature which 
found that older, and more experienced VCs, with a stronger IPO track record, exhibited less 
local bias (Cumming and Dai, 2010). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Our second model, which relates to behavioural and attitudinal characteristics 
described in Table 1, shows that several characteristics have a weak and negative association 
with investment distance. A focus on day-to-day operational involvement in some investee 
companies (weakly) reduced the distance a BA invested at. Equally, being involved in the 
strategic managements of all investee companies also (weakly) reduced the distance invested 
at. In this sense, the more hands-on and involved BAs are, the lower the likelihood that they 
will invest in companies located outside their locality or region. We also find – albeit only at 
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the 10% level of statistical significance – that BAs who are more accepting of the fact that 
some investment lose money, appear more willing to invest locally. 
Our third model includes our set of investment characteristics. BAs with a larger set 
of currently invested companies in their portfolios are associated with greater investment 
distance. This suggests that to build up a portfolio, angels are forced to look beyond their 
immediate locality. In addition, BAs who invest in early-stage companies have a wider 
spatial reach. There were some very specific results regarding size of largest investments, 
with investments between £50k and £100k and between £200k and £500k having a stronger 
local bias than other smaller scale investments. This chimes with other work in Sweden and 
suggests that smaller investments with no or minimal post-investment involvement are less 
dependent on close spatial proximity between BAs and firms (Avdeitchikova, 2008). While 
very small overall, investments in the largest categories (£500k-£1m) only featured at 
regional and national levels. These larger investments are typically made by “super-angels” 
with the capacity to undertake extensive due diligence to evaluate and oversee long-distance 
investments.  
Our consolidated model in Table 2, which incorporates elements of all three broad 
sets of variables, generates some very clear findings relating to investment distance. Our first 
key finding is that BAs who favour becoming involved in the strategic management of 
investee companies have a strong local bias. Again, there may be a practical aspect to this, it 
is easier to become involved if a company is nearby. In line with agency theory, there may 
also be a monitoring aspect to this as BAs can oversee the management team to ensure that 
they are adopting the strategic direction desired. Again, we find a positive relationship 
between investing at distance and years of accumulated investment experience. This may 
relate to confidence and also to competency. Weaker evidence shows a positive association 
between the number of businesses previously run by the BA, another proxy for relevant 
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human capital and experience, and distance when investing. Finally, we note that BAs who 
invest in early stage businesses, as opposed to start-ups or later stage, are more willing to 
invest at distance. Early state businesses may require less relational support that start-ups.  
Given the clear regional disparities in the distribution of BA across the UK regions 
displayed in Figure 1, we also augmented all four models to include a regional identifier for 
the business angels’ home region. Reassuringly, the core findings remain the same, but we 
did establish some consistent regional effects in relation to distance when investing. In our 
augmented model 1 which captured business angels personal characteristics, we observe 
weak (at the 10% level of significance) and negative effects for London (β=-0.687*) and the 
West Midlands (β=-0.867*). In our augmented model 2, which considered behavioural and 
attitudinal characteristics again we only observe two significant regional effects on distance 
when investing and in the same two regions, London (β=-0.916**) and the West Midlands 
(β=-0.780*). Our augmented third model focused on investment characteristics and here we 
found no regional effects. However, in our augmented fourth, and final, model, we find that 
three regions were associated with a distance effect. London (β=-0.773**), the West 
Midlands (β=-0.957*), and the East of England (β=-0.866*). This is also true to a lesser 
degree for BAs located in the West Midlands and the East of England. These findings 
strongly suggest that not only is London a place where there is a disproportionate 
representation of BAs per se, they also tend to invest locally and regionally than angels from 
other parts of the UK.  
We conducted some additional analysis with the specific purpose of adding more 
nuance into the potential effects that economic and financial development of the business 
angels home region might have on their spatial investment strategy. We augmented Model 4 
to include three new variables including, (i) business population per capita in the home 
region, (ii) whether the home region had above UK average Gross Value Added, and, (iii) the 
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share of the business population represented in the business and financial services sectors. In 
order, these variables are intended to capture (a) the potential pool of investment 
opportunities, (b) the productivity of a region, and, (c) the level of economic and financial 
development proxied by business and financial services business activity which derive their 
incomes from the activities and growth of the core business sector. We also included a 
dummy variable to test whether there was something systematically different between single 
investment business angels and those with several (i.e more than one investment in their 
portfolio). 
Our results are reported in Model 5 of Table 3. We find that more experienced 
investors are much more willing to invest at distance, but angels who prefer to adopt a more 
hands-on approach to strategic management in their investee companies want their largest 
investee companies to be geographically proximate. A greater willingness to lose money 
invested is associated with a preference for more local investing. In addition, business angels 
who invest at a larger scale are also associated with a more localised investment strategy. 
These latter two findings suggest that investment scale is not an issue for local investors but if 
they lose they would prefer to lose locally rather than in some distant company. This might 
relate to the greater ease of taking action to try and prevent this cash loss in a crisis situation. 
On our economic and financial indicators, we find that home regions with a higher per capita 
business population are associated with more local investment. This is unsurprising as there 
are costs associated with finding suitable investments at geographic distance and it is easier 
for a BA to locate potential local investments when there is a large business population of 
potential investee companies. Finally, we find no significant difference between single 
investment angels and multiple investment angels which reassures us that our findings are not 
unduly distorted by focusing on the single largest investment. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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5. Discussion  
Empirically, our research suggests the tendency for local bias when making 
investments was less prevalent than expected, especially given the informational and agency 
concerns identified earlier. This was particularly true for BAs located outside the more 
dynamic parts of the UK, such as London and the South East of England. In these southern 
locations there is a stronger propensity towards more localised investment which we unpack 
below. Overall, however, this corroborates others who have suggested that the prevalence for 
local investing by BAs has decreased over time which may reflect a wider evolution of the 
BA investment market (Avdeitchikova, 2008; Harrison et al, 2010; Herrmann et al, 2016).  
We generate novel findings suggesting investment experience is the dominant form of 
human capital in UK BA investing. In the context of our four initial hypotheses, we find 
weak support for a positive relationship between business related human capital/experience 
and investing at distance, but a much stronger and clearer positive relationship between 
investment experience and investing at distance. On active involvement in investee 
companies, we find no relationship in respect of active involvement in day-to-day operational 
management and local bias, but a strong local investment bias for BAs who like to actively 
participate in the strategic management of their investee companies. On balance, we have 
some consistency with the VC based evidence on distance and local bias, and indeed banking 
and crowd funding too. 
What is driving the process of greater longer-distance angel investing? It is now 
widely considered that the angel market is much more organised via networks whereby 
angels collectively pool their resources and investments via syndicates (Kerr et al, 2011). 
This changes the dynamics of BA finance, altering the manner and professionalism within the 
investment process (Bonini et al, 2018). In turn, this may be leading to less spatial 
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embeddedness across angel investors, enabling local angels to access firms across a wider 
spatial catchment area. This chimes with work showing how syndicates offset the risks of 
more spatially diffuse VC investments (Fritsch and Schilder, 2012).  
Another related explanation attributes this trend to the increased use of equity 
crowdfunding platforms. Some studies have revealed almost half (45%) of all UK angels 
invested via equity crowdfunding platforms (Wright et al, 2015). Crowdfunding platforms 
may prove attractive for less experienced angels seeking passive investments with a limited 
administrative burden. Given the increased propensity for angels to invest in crowdfunding 
platforms (Wright et al, 2015; Brown et al, 2018), in time this may recalibrate the nature of 
local bias within BA investing, especially for smaller more “hands off” equity investments.   
From a theoretical perspective, we anticipated informational distance decay and 
agency concerns to preclude long-distance investment. However, it appears that some BA 
investors may be adopting different strategies to obviate distance effects by other relationship 
enhancing means which are reconfiguring the relational geography of these informal equity 
investments. Clearly, the relational geographies of BA investors are being reformulated by a 
range of professional networks (e.g. syndicates) and technological processes (e.g. equity 
crowdfunding). The angels examined also displayed an “effectual” or experimental logic by 
starting out close to home and then expanding their investment networks further afield 
(Wiltbank et al, 2009). Clearly, the attitudes and behaviours of angels change with experience 
(Herrmann et al, 2016). As BAs gain experience their proclivity to invest more widely 
increases, suggesting important “learning by doing” effectual processes. With accrued 
experience the need for a hands-on approach based on close physical distance diminishes.  
In this sense, we could argue that local bias is important for novice BAs as it provides 
a good ‘nursery’ where they can use their well-established local networks and strong 
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relational proximity to actively monitor and get physically involved in the management and 
strategic decision-making of their investee companies. But once sufficient experience has 
been accumulated, angels are happier making more passive “hands off” investments across 
the UK and feel less need to “babysit” their investee companies. To mitigate attendant agency 
risks of longer-distance investing, UK BAs seem to concentrate their larger investments 
locally with longer-distance investments in the small sub-50k categories.  
6. Conclusions 
This study considers the under-researched issue of local bias in informal risk capital. 
First, we found that an absolute majority of BA investments are made outside of the angel’s 
immediate locality and home region, calling into question the “local bias thesis”. In this 
sense, perhaps due to its geographical ‘compactness’ and changing relational geographies the 
angel market in the UK is becoming more mobile, especially for more seasoned BAs. 
Clearly, the relational geographies of BA investors are being reformulated by a range of 
professional networks, new investment vehicles and technological processes (e.g. equity 
crowdfunding).  
A key finding is that investment experience dominates business experience in the 
context of investing at distance. Plus, there appears to be a strong “learning-by-doing” effect 
through which individuals engage in investment activity become more experienced and gain 
the confidence to invest at arms-length in a literal (passive investor) and physical way (at 
greater distance). Angels undergo important changes to their investment behaviour which are 
temporally, experientially and spatially mediated. The second major empirical contribution 
centres on the major spatial imbalances identified within the geography of informal risk 
capital in the UK. These regional disparities and stronger propensity for localised investment 
patterns by angels in southerly regions are undoubtedly mediated by the well-developed or 
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“thick” nature of informal risk capital market in these locations compared to the “thin” 
markets evident within the UK’s more northerly peripheral regions4. A concentration of BAs 
in the most affluent parts of the UK is reflected in a higher number of investable 
opportunities in these areas as well. This is symptomatic of the spatial centralization of the 
UK’s financial system which new fintech technologies (i.e. crowdfunding) seem to be 
exacerbating rather than overcoming, thereby providing further evidence that financial 
markets – in driving capital to core regions – are perpetuating uneven regional development 
(Klagge et al, 2017). 
The research has important public policy implications. As noted earlier, there are 
deep-seated spatial imbalances in the distribution of BAs across the UK which restrict the 
ability of start-ups and new ventures to obtain inter-regional capital transfers from BAs 
located in the South-East of England. Additionally, while considerable policy efforts have 
been devised to help develop localised networks of BAs across some peripheral UK regions 
such as Scotland and the North-East of England (Martin et al, 2002), these may not 
necessarily benefit local start-ups if more experienced angels seek out investment 
opportunities further afield.  Clearly, however, steering the locational whereabouts of BA 
investments is a difficult, if not impossible, policy objective. However, policy makers in 
finance-deficient regions may have to make concerted efforts to foster links between their 
nascent entrepreneurial ventures and angels located outside their local region to facilitate 
“cross-regional” access to angel investment (Clarysse, et al, 2014).  
Our research opens up interesting avenues for further research. Our data is from 2014 
and there have been significant changes since then, most recently the shock caused by the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  If time-series or panel data on BAs becomes available, it would be 
 
4 Thin markets occur “where limited numbers of investors and entrepreneurial growth firms within the economy 
have difficulty finding and contracting with each other” (Nightingale et al, 2009, p.5).  
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interesting to establish the temporal dynamics of the experience-distance relationship. A 
future key issue warranting further investigation is what impact the growing role of equity 
crowdfunding is having on BA investors. Further in-depth research on this topic would be 
useful for probing how technology is changing the relational geographies of BA activities and 
how this affects the investment-distance nexus.  
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